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Abstract
Several recent papers have found that exogenous shocks to spreads paid in corporate
creditmarketsareasubstantialsourceofmacroeconomicﬂuctuations. Analternative
explanationofthedataisthatspreadsrespondendogenouslytoexpectationsoffuture
default. We use a simple model of bond spreads to derive sign restrictions on the
impulse-response functions of a VAR that identify credit shocks in the bond market,
and compare them to results from a benchmark recursive VAR. We ﬁnd that credit
market shocks cause a persistent decline in output, prices and policy rates. Historical
decompositions clearly show the negative eect of adverse credit market shocks on
outputintherecentrecession. Theidentiﬁedcreditshocksareunrelatedtoexogenous
innovationstomonetarypolicyandmeasuresofbondmarketliquidity,butarerelated
to measures of risk compensation. In contrast to results found using the benchmark
restrictions, our identiﬁed credit shocks account for relatively little of the variance of
output. Our results are consistent with a role for shocks in ﬁnancial crises, but also
with a lesser but non-zero role in normal business ﬂuctuations.
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1Docreditmarketshocksdriveoutputﬂuctuations? Recentexperienceduringtheﬁnancial
crisis seems to show that they do: A graphic case was made for how a shock to the money
markets, especially if it aects highly levered ﬁnancial ﬁrms, can precipitate ﬁnancial
distress which is quickly transmitted to the real economy. But is the story always so
simple? For non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, which tend to carry less leverage, there is usually scope
to oset shocks to market credit by drawing upon alternative sources of funds, such as
bank credit lines (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999) or retained earnings. Further, because
mostborrowingbynon-ﬁnancialﬁrmsislongterminnature,arelativelysmallproportion
of outstanding debt must be reﬁnanced each month. Consequently a shock to the bond
market might not be expected to have immediate eects on output. Moreover, shocks
may be suciently infrequent that they play little role in the ‘normal’ ups and downs
of the business cycle. Thus Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 43) argue that except in rare
ﬁnancial crises, credit is not a ‘primitive driving force’ of economic ﬂuctuations1.
Intheabsenceofcreditmarketshocks,changesinspreadswouldbedrivenbychanges
in default risk. Figure 1 depicts the spread on a broad index of speculative-grade (syn-
onymously, ‘high yield’) bonds alongside default rates2. Periods of stress in the credit
market, marked by higher default rates and wider spreads, are evident during recessions;
for example, in the recent downturn the spread peaked at a little over two thousand basis
points (hundredths of a percent), compared to six hundred basis points a year earlier.
One hypothesis attributes a large portion of this increase to credit shocks. An alternative
explanation of the data is that credit spreads responded endogenously to fundamental
macroeconomic shocks that altered the expected likelihood of default. Understanding
1Cochrane (1994) strikes a similarly skeptical note on the importance of credit shocks for output ﬂuctua-
tions, although he too makes an allowance for the negative impact of banking crises. There is evidence from
non-crisis periods that bank loan supply shocks do have a systematic impact on at least some components
of GDP (Peek and Rosengren, 2000), but nagging problems of identiﬁcation and measurement often remain.
2The spread is deﬁned as the dierence between the yield on a risky (defaultable) corporate bond, and
the yield on a safe Treasury bond of equivalent time-to-maturity. Most high yield bonds are rated between
BB and B, with the term ‘junk’ usually reserved for bonds rated CCC and below. Gertler and Lown (1999)
argue that the speculative-grade bond spread is likely to proxy well for the cost of ﬁnance prevailing for
more credit constrained ﬁrms in the economy, and thus is a good indicator of overall ﬁnancial conditions.
Some support for this conjecture comes from the close correlation between the default rate on high yield
bonds and commercial banks’ write-o rate on C&I loans.
2which view has the most merit is of clear practical importance3.
This paper sets out to gauge the eects of credit market shocks, with a focus on the
market for high yield corporate bonds. Using monthly data from 1982-2009, we develop
ajointvectorautoregressive(VAR)modelofcreditspreadsanddefaultrates, alongwitha
set of key macroeconomic indicators. In doing so, we build on the related work of Gertler
and Lown (1999) and Balke (2000), who study the ﬁnancial accelerator, and Friedman and
Kuttner (1998), who use a VAR to decompose movements in the paper-bill spread. The
paper closest to ours is Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajˇ sek (2009). They extract two credit
market factors from a carefully constructed panel of bond spreads spanning the period
between 1990 and 2008, and model them in a VAR. They report that a shock to their main
bond market factor leads to lower output and lower real interest rates. Their ﬁndings also
suggest that credit shocks are a signiﬁcant factor in economic ﬂuctuations, accounting for
30% of the variability of output, and a large fraction of the variability of spreads.
An advantage of the VAR approach is that it allows both for the direct eects of
credit shocks on the macroeconomy, and for feedbacks from the macroeconomy to the
credit market. To apply the VAR methodology to our question, the credit shock must
be identiﬁed. In the past, this step has been left quite vague, with most researchers
specifying a causal ordering of the variables based on an assumption on the timing of
shocks. We depart from past studies by motivating identiﬁcation from explicit economic
assumptions. Using a simple model of bond prices, we show that fundamental shocks
thatcausemovementsinexpecteddefaultcanbeseparatedfromcreditmarketshocksthat
do not, by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse-response functions of spreads and
default rates. Throughout, we leave agnostically open the responses of output, monetary
policy and other asset prices. As in Uhlig (2005), this approach leaves the data free to
speak on the question of interest.
3To answer the question deﬁnitively, we would require a model that speciﬁes the source of credit mar-
ket shocks, and their transmission mechanism. Unfortunately, there is no widely agreed-upon integrated
ﬁnancial-macro model to provide such a description. However, the contributions of Nolan and Thoenissen
(2009) and Jermann and Quadrini (2009) suggest that credit market shocks will play an important role in
matching theoretical models to the data.




both the 2001 and 2007-9 recessions. In the case of the most recent downturn, the eect of
creditmarketshocksindrivingupspreadspriortothestartoftherecessionisparticularly
noteworthy. Under our sign restriction approach, we can attribute at most 15% of the
variance of output to credit market shocks at one-to-two year horizons, and very little of
the variation in spreads. The average contribution to output ﬂuctuations is similar when
we exclude the recent ﬁnancial crisis from the sample. In sum, our main results show
that credit shocks did play an independent role in the recent crisis, but contrary to the
argumentinBernankeandGertler(1995), theyalsoappeartomakealimitedbutnon-zero
contribution to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations even in ‘normal’ times.
As a check, we compare our results to those obtained using a benchmark model that
imposesacontemporaneouslyrecursiveidentiﬁcationstructure, similartothatemployed
in previous studies. The conclusions reached using the benchmark identiﬁcation are very
dierent: we show that at one-to-two year horizons, three quarters of the variation in
spreads, and a third of the variation in output is attributed to ‘credit shocks’.
The reader should be aware of what we do not do in this paper. First, we do not
claim to give a comprehensive account of credit market disruptions. The market for
high yield bonds, although an important source of business ﬁnance, did not trigger the
ﬁnancial crisis which began in 2007. However, we argue that the deliberately narrow
view of credit market disturbances adopted here has little risk of confounding the eects
of macroeconomic shocks. Second, a number of studies have examined credit market
shocks resulting from ﬁnancial deregulation, such as the removal of interest rate ceilings,
on macroeconomic performance and monetary policy (Benk et al. (2005); Mertens (2008)).
However, the long-term structural consequences of regulatory changes are not the main
focus of this paper. Such changes are unlikely to be unanticipated at monthly or quarterly
4frequencies, and indeed regulatory policy may be shaped in response to macroeconomic
developments rather than being truly exogenous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 motivates the approach
to identiﬁcation by outlining an economic model of the spread. Our data are discussed
in section 2.1, with a discussion of the results of an impulse-response analysis in section
2.2. The importance of credit market shocks in past recessions is detailed in section 2.3,
and their overall role in macroeconomic ﬂuctuations is related in section 2.4. We compare
sign restrictions with recursive identiﬁcation in section 3.1. Section 3.2 discusses external
validation, and some caveats are outlined in section 3.3. Finally, section 4 concludes.
1 Identifying credit market shocks
Our ﬁrst task is to disentangle shocks that arise from the corporate bond market from
fundamental macroeconomic shocks. The tool we will use is a structural VAR, identiﬁed
using sign restrictions on the response functions of credit variables. Identifying the
eects of individual macroeconomic shocks, although possible in this framework, is not
necessary to achieve our particular aim. Thus will we concern ourselves only with how
to split out credit shocks from all the rest4.
Structural identiﬁcation requires that we take a stand on the behavioral relationships
between variables. Some assumption is needed because the same reduced form relation-
ship can be generated by many dierent behavioral models, but naturally a poor choice
can lead us to draw erroneous conclusions. The assumption that has been used in the
literature is that the variables in the VAR can be arranged in a Wold causal chain with
bond spreads ordered last. A drawback of this approach is that economic theory does not
usuallydeliverrestrictionsthattakethisform. Instead, wewilladopttheassumptionthat
fundamental macroeconomic shocks drive the corporate bond spread solely by altering
the likelihood of future default. We will refer to movements in spreads that are caused by
4A detailed description of the sign restrictions approach to identiﬁcation can be found in Canova and De
Nicol´ o (2002) and Uhlig (2005). Peersman (2005) identiﬁes all four structural macroeconomic shocks in a
four-dimensional VAR.
5changes in expected default rates as the ‘default channel’. We will take residual changes
inthespread, afterpurgingtheeectofexpecteddefault, tobe‘purelyﬁnancial’inorigin.
These will be labeled credit market shocks.
Two points are worth stressing about the proposed identiﬁcation. First, separating
the default component matters as it is widely recognized that the default channel does
not fully account for changes in bond spreads. The approach of ﬁrst purging the eect of
default from the bond spread, and then examining the residual ‘non-default’ component,
hasbeenappliedfruitfullyintheﬁnanceliterature. Forexample,Longstaetal.(2005)use
credit default swap (CDS) data to establish the existence of a time varying non-default
component in spreads, which they attribute to liquidity eects. Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001)considerarangeofvariablesthat‘structural’modelsofdefaultsayexplainchanges
in spreads. Their regression results show that these variables are able to capture only a
quarter of the movements in spreads across a large panel of bonds, and they conclude
that most variation is due to market-speciﬁc shocks5. Furthermore, in macroeconomics,
the importance of the default channel in the link between credit spreads and real activity
has been questioned. In their forecasting survey, Stock and Watson (2003) note that
spreads ‘have the potential to provide useful forecasts of real activity, and at times they
have, but the obvious default risk channel appears not to be the relevant channel by
which [they] have their predictive content.’ Second, the assumption that fundamental
macroeconomic shocks work through the default channel is consistent with popular
models of ﬁnancial frictions (Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Bernanke et al. (1999); De
Graeve (2008)). Moreover, where we have external measures of macroeconomic shocks,
the assumption is testable. This issue is taken up in section 3.2, which deals with model
validation.
5It is important to distinguish between the contribution of default likelihood to changes in the spread,
and to its level. In addition to compensation for default loss, the average level of the spread is explained by
taxation eects and compensation for systematic risk (Elton et al., 2001). The ‘non-default’ component of
spreads is found to be largest for investment-grade bonds.
61.1 The restrictions in detail
This section describes how our identifying assumption maps into sign restrictions
on the impulse-response functions for the bond spread and default rate in a VAR. The
intuition is fairly straightforward. At each point in time, the VAR gives us a projection for
thepathoffuturespreadsanddefaultrates. Onewaytothinkabouttheimpulse-response
function is as the revision made to this projection, conditional (in our case) on a credit
market shock. Suppose the observed bond spread St increases. The default component
of St can be shown to depend on the cumulative likelihood of default over some horizon
hd. If we revise upward our expectation of the cumulative likelihood of default, then
we will attribute the increase in the measured spread to a fundamental shock operating
through the default channel. By restricting the cumulative revision to default likelihood
to be non-positive, we therefore isolate movements in the measured bond spread which
are unrelated to default and are, under our assumptions, due to credit market shocks6.
Matters can be clariﬁed using a simple two-period example, in which investors are
assumed to be risk-neutral, and defaulting bonds are assumed to have a zero recovery
rate. Thenthedierenceinyieldbetweenadefaultableandarisk-freebondwithidentical
promised cash-ﬂows can be thought of as the compensation investors demand to bear
the risk of default over the lifetime or ‘tenor’ of the bond. Consider a zero-coupon bond
that pays $1 with certainty in two periods’ time. If its price at time t is P
(2)
t , then its
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6A related approach to the one we describe is the present value VAR model proposed in Campbell and
Shiller (1987). Their method would be applicable if we were to model the level of corporate bond yields,







t . Wewillthinkof ˜ St asthecomponentoftheobserved
credit spread St that is due solely to expected default. When the default intensity is
stochastic, an adjustment must be made for Jensen’s inequality in order to pass the
logarithm through the expectation in (1). A convenient formulation is for the default
probabilities to be independent lognormal with constant second moments. In this case,
when s is not too large the spread is well approximated by
˜ S
(2)
t  Et[t+1] + Et[t+2] + c (2)
for some constant c depending on the variance of s. The sign of the response of ˜ S
(2)
t to
credit shock can be seen to depend upon the sign of the cumulative change in expected
defaults.
We can now distinguish between two cases. If a shock that increases measured bond
spreads also leads us to revise upward our expectation of the cumulative default rate in
equation (2), the sign of the response of S and for ˜ S
(2)
t would also coincide. We will say
that such a shock operates through the default channel. On the other hand, if a shock
leads to wider measured spreads S
(2)
t > 0, but a lower cumulative likelihood of default
˜ S
(2)
t < 0, we will label it a credit shock. To make the sign restriction operational in the
following sections, the two-period example is generalized in the obvious way to account
for bonds with tenors of several years, by an appropriate choice of restriction horizon hd.
We specify how hd is chosen in section 2.2, but turn now to a discussion of our data and
results.
2 Data and Results
2.1 Data
Our data runs monthly from November 1982 to April 2009. These dates span a period
from the end of the Volker-era non-borrowed reserves targeting to the start of ‘credit
easing’ (Bernanke, 2009). Where the underlying observations are at a daily frequency,
we use the data for the last day of the month. The ﬁrst set of variables is reasonably
standard for monetary economics. Output and prices are measured by the log industrial
8production (IP) index and the log core consumer price index (P) respectively, while policy
is measured by the eective federal funds rate (FFR), and the log of real M17.
Thesecondsetconsistsofourcreditandassetmarketvariables. Monthlydefaultrates
are for the universe of Moody’s rated U.S. speculative-grade corporate bonds8. Moody’s
deﬁnes default events broadly to include any missed payments of interest or principal,
the initiation of bankruptcy or other legal blocks to payments, and distressed exchanges
which reduce the issuer’s ﬁnancial obligations (for example, an exchange of a less senior
foramoreseniorobligation). Denotethenumberofdefaultsinmonthtbydt,andthetotal
number of rated issues outstanding by Nt. An estimate of the marginal default likelihood
at time t attaching to a broad portfolio of speculative grade bonds is constructed as the
trailing12-monthcumulativedefaultrateDt =
P11
s=0 dt s=Nt 11. ItcanbeseenthatDt isthe
proportion of those issues outstanding 12 months ago that defaulted. The denominator N
is adjusted for ratings withdrawals, due to scheduled repayments, calls, or mergers. The
measure is issuer-based, meaning that the expected likelihood of default for a particular
issue with a particular rating is expected to be the same regardless of its nominal size (see
Hamilton and Cantor (2006) for details of Moody’s methodology).
The bond spread (St) is measured as the dierence between the yield to maturity on a
value-weighted portfolio of cash-pay only corporate bonds and the yield to maturity on
a closely-matching government bond. The corporate bond index covers a broad segment
7Other authors have favored monthly estimates of aggregate GDP over the IP index. The aggregate
output measure that is most comparable is GDP for goods. It comprises durable and nondurable personal
consumption expenditures, ﬁxed investment, change in private inventories, and net exports (further expla-
nation can be found on the BEA website). There is a debate on whether money is a necessary component in
a VAR model. In this paper we chose to be inclusive, but for the purposes of identifying the credit shock,
it made little dierence to our conclusions if it were excluded, or if total and non-borrowed reserves were
included instead of M1 (for the period November 1982 to December 2007).
8Moody’s deﬁnes this universe as those senior unsecured bonds carrying a rating of Ba1 or lower (the
Standard and Poor’s equivalent rating is BB+). The equivalent series of speculative-grade default rates
produced by Standard and Poor’s has a correlation of .96 with the Moody’s series. Other studies have made
use of structural estimates of default likelihood, such as MKMV (e.g. Gilchrist et al. (2009)). Jarrow and
Turnbull (2000) oer a detailed critique of these methods, and argue that they tend to under-predict the
likelihood of default during recessions. Market-based measures such as credit default swap (CDS) rates are
available for a limited number of the largest companies, and have a relatively short history (see Longsta
et al. (2005)).
9of the U.S. high yield corporate market, so as to match as closely as possible the universe
of bonds used in the default series9. The maturity of the portfolio, measured by its
Macaulay duration, is almost constant over time at about 6 years. We nevertheless ensure
that the yield spread is calculated with respect to the Treasury bond of equivalent time to
maturity following each month’s portfolio re-balancing, to avoid conﬂating movements
in the corporate bond spread with changes in term premiums10. The average quality
rating of the portfolio remains in the B1/B2 range, a category described by Moody’s as
being ‘subject to high credit risk’. Because the bond index starts only in November 1984,
we interpolate back an additional two years of data using a quarterly index from Gertler
and Lown (1999) and a monthly index of Moodys Baa-rated bonds (none of the results are
sensitive to excluding the interpolated data). Last, we include an equity price index (EQt)
for mid-sized stocks, the S&P MidCap 400, to capture linkages between asset markets,
and as a proxy for collateral values.
2.2 Impulse-responses
The baseline statistical model is a Bayesian VAR(6) with yt = [ln(IPt), ln(Pt), FFRt,
ln(M1/Pt), (EQt), Dt, St]’ (details of our estimation methods can be found in Appendix
A). We begin with the results from the sign restrictions approach. Sign restrictions
limit the way that expectations are revised relative to baseline, following a shock. We
restrict the response of corporate bond spreads to be positive for hs = 6 months, and
the cumulative response of the default rate to be non-positive for hd = 48 months. The
results were not sensitive to imposing the second restriction for longer or shorter periods,
9The Merrill Lynch index is a widely-used benchmark for assessing portfolio performance. For inclusion
in the index, bonds must be a year or more from maturity, be U.S. dollar denominated, and have at least $100
million face value outstanding. The ‘cash pay’ index excludes deferred interest and pay-in-kind issues. Full
details of the calculations behind the index can be found in Galdi (1997).
10We calculated spreads against zero-coupon Treasury yields estimated from a Svensson yield curve from
the Federal Reserve Board. This measure of the spread is not fully satisfactory as the returns on a coupon
bearing bond and a zero coupon bond of identical Macaulay durations will be equal only up to a ﬁrst-order,
and only for a level shift in the yield curve. However, in the absence of information on coupon schedules
it is likely to be a reasonable approximation, and it is widely used in the literature. Gilchrist et al. (2009)
investigated the properties of the similar Merrill Lynch Master II index as a comparator, but calculated the
spread relative to a 10-year government bond, rather than adjusting for duration each month as we do here.
10although in order for our identiﬁcation to be sensible, it was thought that imposing the
signrestrictionforlessthanthreeyearswasundesirableastheaverageMacaulayduration
of the bond portfolio is around six years. Imposing the restriction for more than ﬁve years
has little eect since default risk at very long horizons is not greatly inﬂuenced by current
macroeconomic conditions.
The estimated responses to a one standard deviation adverse credit market shock
(one that raises the credit spread) are shown in ﬁgure 2. The solid line shows the median
value of the impulse-response function distribution for each horizon h across all posterior
draws. The dashed lines give the 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse-response
function distribution at each h. Output is estimated to drop sharply on impact, and is
expected to remain low for a protracted period, beginning to recover only after a year.
The error band indicates that with high probability, output remains below its baseline
value for a full two years following the shock, indicating that credit-induced recessions
may be followed by sluggish recoveries. The responses of the funds rate and of money
are consistent with a systematic easing of monetary policy in reaction to a combination of
lower output and lower prices. The fall in output occurs for the usual reasons: Because
ﬁrms face a higher cost of market funds and thus higher eective input costs, standard
theory predicts lower input demand and lower output11.
Default rates also decrease on impact. The initial fall of roughly a quarter of a per-
centage point is followed by a slow increase as defaults respond endogenously to lower
real activity. The rate levels o after a year, when output begins to recover. There are
several reasons underlying the lower default rates. Firstly, ﬁrms under ﬁnancial stress
are known to take a variety of steps to improve their creditworthiness. Asquith et al.’s
(1994) study of junk bond issuers presents evidence that ﬁrms respond to a higher cost of
funds by raising cash through asset sales, which reduce productive capacity but improve
liquidity, and by outright mergers12. On the other side of their balance sheets, ﬁrms
11In the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, alternative means of ﬁnancing are imperfectly substitutable, giving
rise to ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ eects (Bernanke and Gertler (1995); Gertler and Lown (1999)).
12Mergers, in which the acquiring ﬁrm generally assumes the debt of the target, can be thought of as a 100
percent asset sale.
11make important changes to their private (i.e. bank) liabilities, which are designed to
alleviate near term stress and at the same time improve creditworthiness. These margins
of adjustment can lead to fewer outright defaults, even as output is cut. Secondly, if
ﬁrms respond to the credit shock by delaying new debt issues, lower aggregate default
rates can be explained by the well-known ‘aging eect’ (Helwege and Kleiman, 1996).
Historically, more recently-issued bonds have experienced a higher frequency of default
than seasoned bonds, so fewer new issues would mean lower average default rates13.
The negative eect on output is present even though no restrictions are placed on the
sign or shape of its response function (or that of any non-credit-related variable) under
our approach. By contrast, the initial drop seen in ﬁgure 2 is ruled out by recursive
identiﬁcation schemes, where it is assumed that the response occurs only with a delay14.
We take up the discussion of this point in section 3.1 below.
2.3 Historical decomposition
Further insight into the eects of credit market shocks can be gained by considering
thehistoricalcontributionstheyhavemadetoﬂuctuationsinoutputandspreads. Results
are shown for the median model (see Appendix A). The top panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the
deviation of actual industrial production from a projection based on pre-sample data,
and the contribution of credit shocks to this deviation. The lower panel of ﬁgure 3 shows
the same information for the high-yield bond spread. The net contribution of all the
other (unidentiﬁed) shocks is then the dierence between the two lines in each of these
ﬁgures. Naturally, without identifying the other shocks we are unable to say whether
credit played the dominant role in a particular episode, but we can gauge its absolute
importance.
The recessions of the early 1990s, of 2001 and of 2007-9 are marked by clear declines
13As noted in the minutes of the October 2008 FOMC meeting, new issuance of speculative-grade bonds
all but ceased in the fall of 2008. McDonald and Van de Gucht (1999) document that the default likelihood
of a new issue increases sharply at two years and then steadily declines, such that an issue that has survived
for ﬁve years is about half as likely to default as an issue that has survived only two years.
14The sign restriction approach allows for the possibility of delayed responses, which correspond to the
case of the rotation matrix Q given in Appendix A being close to diagonal.
12in industrial output. In the last two cases, the cumulative eect of credit market shocks
during these episodes was negative for industrial production. However, credit market
shocks did not cause the 1990-1 recession. Although spreads were higher than in the base
projection, the model attributes most of the increase to higher expected defaults, defaults
which did transpire (see ﬁgure 1). By contrast, the 2001 recession was driven in part by
credit shocks. From the peak of the business cycle in February 2001, to the trough of
the recession in November, industrial production contracted 5.2% (relative to a baseline
projection) of which 3.3%, or roughly two thirds, was due to credit shocks15. Spreads
peakedinSeptember2001,at2.3percentagepoints(pp)abovepre-recessionlevels. Credit
shocks made a 3.4pp contribution, one-and-a-half times the total increase (meaning that
the combined eects of other shocks was to lower spreads over this period).
Thelargestabsoluteeects,unsurprisingly,areseenduringthe2007-9recession. From
the business cycle peak in November 2007 to the endof the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, industrial
production contracted 16%. Credit shocks account for a 6.7% decline, just over two ﬁfths
of the total. From the onset of the subprime crisis in June 2007, through to the start of
the recession in December 2007, credit shocks raised spreads by a cumulative 1.1pp out
of a total increase of 3pp. This accords well with the pattern of defaults over that period,
which hit an all time low of 1% in December, and with narrative accounts that show that
over this period, the full extent of the crisis was hardly imagined. On the eve of the
crisis, The Economist called corporate debt defaults ‘the mosquito that did not bite in the
night’, and asked when the default cycle would turn, while S&P’s issued upgrades for a
large number of junk bonds16. Anecdotal evidence would seem to agree with what our
model-based forecasts tell us, namely that in the earlier stages of the crisis spreads were
driven higher by credit market shocks. Once the recession got underway, spreads rose
by a further 13.8pp, of which 6.3pp were due to credit shocks. With default rates forecast
to reach double digits, more than half of the increase in spreads over this period was an
15By this we mean that under a counterfactual scenario in which credit shocks were zero over the same
period,butallothershockstookthesamevalues,fourﬁfthsofthedeclineinoutputwouldnothaveoccurred.
16‘Unsinkable junk’, The Economist, June 24, 2007; ‘S&P upgrades 1,500 junk bonds and loans’, Financial
Times, June 7, 2007.
13endogenous response to expected credit losses.
2.4 Variance decomposition
In this section, we report variance decompositions for macroeconomic and credit
variables over the 1982–2009 period. Arguably, the period from June 2007 has been far
from average, and sowe compute the same statisticson a shorter sample whichomits it17.
We should keep in mind when looking at these results that the particular type of credit
disturbance we have identiﬁed may be only one of several ways in which credit shocks
might impinge on the economy. There may well be other distinct, uncorrelated credit
disturbances which we do not measure here, the most obvious arising from the banking
sector, or as recently, from markets for securitized credit products18. For that reason, the
results we obtain are best regarded as giving a lower bound for the contribution of credit
market shocks to the business cycle.
Table 1 reports the percentage contribution of credit market shocks to the total mean
square prediction error in output, default rates and spreads at various horizons. The
left panels report our results under sign restrictions. On the full sample, the median
proportion of output variation accounted for at the one-year horizon is 15%, with the
68% probability interval extending from 3% to 36%. On the sub-sample that excludes the
2007-9 crisis period, the median contribution is 21%, somewhat higher, while the range of
uncertainty is wider, from 7% to 46%. As overall output volatility was signiﬁcantly lower
in the pre-crisis sample, mechanically the ﬁnding that credit market shocks contributed
moretovolatilityintheearlierperiodmustmeanthatthepre-crisisshockswerenotmuch
smaller on average than those during the crisis.
Estimates for the contribution of credit market shocks to the variance of spreads are
small in both full and sub-samples. On the full sample, their average contribution is
17WedateMay2007astheendofthe‘normal’period, asJunesawtheclosureoftwohedgefundsmanaged
by Bear Stearns that specialized in subprime asset-backed securities, the ﬁrst such collapse of the crisis.
18Spreads on speculative-grade bonds are not likely to be informative about the state of the banking sector.
AsofDecember2008, noneofthe50largestbankholdingcompanieshaddebtratedbelowBaa. Furthermore,
regulatory rules prohibit banks from holding below investment grade debt.
14never far above 7% at any horizon. Spreads are highly volatile, and credit market shocks
are small, thus the bulk of the variation in spreads is due to other disturbances19. In
line with previous studies, it appears that for high yield corporate bonds, ‘non-default’
shocks do not account for much of the variation in spreads. The estimated credit shocks
unsurprisingly account for only a small part of the variation in default rates at business
cycle frequencies.
The results just outlined lend support to the view that credit market shocks do play a
role in business cycle ﬂuctuations. As is usual in this type of analysis, we cannot gauge
the magnitude of their contribution to output ﬂuctuations with high precision, but at the
one-to-two year horizon it is probably about 15%. Even in ‘normal’ times, credit shocks
matter, but their contribution is well below that reported in recent VAR studies. The
following section investigates why this might be.
3 Further discussion
3.1 Why do conventional restrictions give such different results?
We now consider a recursive identiﬁcation strategy similar to that used in several
previous studies. As we use monthly rather than quarterly data, the timing restriction
imposed by recursiveness may not be thought particularly strict. However, we show that
it materially alters the conclusions drawn from the data20. The causal ordering broadly
follows that used by Friedman and Kuttner (1998), Gertler and Lown (1999), Balke (2000)
and others. It implies that innovations to output and prices can aect monetary policy
within the month. It also implies that all the macroeconomic variables feedback to the
credit market within the month, but not vice versa. In particular, innovations to the
spread cannot aect the eective funds rate, equity prices or the likelihood of default
within the month21.
19Figure 2 shows that a one standard deviation credit shock raises spreads by 10-20bp.
20All the results reported in this section are based on the same posterior draws as for the sign restrictions
results above.
21The conclusions of this section are not aected by changing the ordering of the VAR so that defaults are
ordered after spreads, and can react on impact to the spread shock.
15Theresponsetoanorthogonalinnovationtospreadsundertherecursiveidentiﬁcation
scheme is shown in ﬁgure 4. An increased spread leads to lower real activity and to
somewhat easier monetary policy as the funds rate is lowered and real balances rise.
Equity prices undergo a signiﬁcant and protracted decline. Such responses are broadly
similar to type of picture seen for example in Balke (2000, Fig. 2) or Gilchrist et al. (2009,
Fig. 5). The most important dierence compared to sign restrictions is that the shock is
associated with substantially higher default rates over the two following years which, by
causing an endogenous rise in spreads through the default channel, tends to amplify its
eects.
Variance decompositions under the recursive identiﬁcation scheme are shown in the
right panels of table 1. There are some marked dierences with the sign restrictions
results. First, the contribution of credit market shocks to output variation is substan-
tially greater than under sign restrictions, and peaks at business cycle rather than short
frequencies. This is the case in both samples, although the ex-crisis results show lower
contributionsthanthefullsample. Atone-to-twoyears,theyaccountforaroundathirdof
the ﬂuctuations in output. The probability intervals are as wide as under sign restrictions
at the longer horizons, even though credit shocks make no contribution to ﬂuctuations
at h = 0 by construction. In fact, for 16% of draws, more than half of output variance is
attributed to credit market shocks at horizons over two years.
Second, most of the variation in credit spreads is attributed to credit shocks. Their
contribution is 73% at one year, and remains above 50% even after ﬁve years. The
varianceofdefaultratesisalsostronglyaectedbytherecursively-identiﬁedcreditshocks
at horizons over a year. An implication is that credit spreads barely register the eect
of macroeconomic shocks, even over longer horizons. The size of the contribution made
by credit market shocks to the variance decompositions of output and credit variables is
something of a surprise. Gilchrist et al. (2009) argue that large eects may be explicable if
bond spreads mainly reﬂect premiums on risk and liquidity, an issue we take up below.
An alternative explanation is that the recursive scheme confounds ﬁnancial shocks with
16fundamental macro shocks. Indeed, the sign pattern of responses for output, prices and
monetary policy shown in ﬁgure 4 are often taken to identify an adverse demand shock
(see, for example, Peersman (2005)).
3.2 Are the identiﬁed shocks reasonable?
This section returns to the VAR identiﬁed using sign restrictions, as discussed in
section 1. We undertake to validate our results using information from outside the VAR,
asawayofbuildingconﬁdenceandgaininginsightintothemodel 22. Theestimatedcredit
shocks for the median model are shown in ﬁgure 5. The terrorist attacks of September
2001, and the market freeze following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008
manifest as large spikes in the series.
Although these shocks appear to be reasonable, an important motivation for our
identiﬁcation scheme was that it should not confound credit market and macroeconomic
shocks. The ﬁrst check we perform tests whether our estimated credit market shocks
satisfythatbasicassumption. Second,thediscussioninsection1abstractedfromliquidity
eects, which empirical studies of corporate bond markets often ﬁnd are important, and
it assumed that investors were risk neutral, whereas in practice, there is good evidence to
suggest that they demand a premium for bearing default risk. We examine each of these
issues in turn.
Monetary Policy Shocks: Surprise moves in monetary policy are often taken to be a
fundamental driver of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. They are also an obvious source
of high-frequency variation in interest rates that should be unrelated to credit shocks.
We calculated monetary policy shocks derived from movements in the Federal Funds
Futures (FFF) rate for each month in which there was a scheduled FOMC meeting23. We
have approximately 16 years of data, starting in 1992, and after allowing for months in
22For a critique of the structural VAR method in another context, see Rudebusch (1998).
23For full details of how we constructed the policy shocks, see Faust et al. (2004). Note that the match
betweenourcreditshocks, whichcorrespondtoend-of-monthdata, andthepolicyshocks, whichcorrespond
to meeting day data, is somewhat imperfect.
17which there was no scheduled policy meeting are left with 131 data points. Figure 6 plots
monetary policy shocks against the VAR-based credit market shocks (where the latter are
rescaled so both series have the same variance). Bars join observations on a given date
to make the association clearer. It does not appear to be a close one: for example, in
September and October 2008 there were two large adverse credit shocks; in September
the futures market was surprised by monetary policy being 5bp tighter than anticipated,
but in October policy was 6bp looser. To investigate further, we regressed the estimated
credit shock ˆ vt on the monetary policy shock. The results were as follows (t-statistics in
parentheses):
ˆ vt =  :196 + 1:19 ˆ "FFF
t ; R2 = :00188; N = 131
(1:65) (:492)
The regression reveals no statistical association between our estimated credit market
shocks,andtheindependentlymeasuredexogenousmonetarypolicyshocks. Thisﬁnding
adds conﬁdence to the identifying assumptions adopted in section 1. It also suggests that
the degree of error in our measurement of the bond spread is not too large.
Liquidity Shocks: Chen et al. (2007) investigate bond-speciﬁc liquidity eects using de-
tailed quote data, which includes liquidity proxies such as the size of the bid-ask spread,
and the occurrence of zero returns. They ﬁnd that the liquidity of individual bond is-
sues is a signiﬁcant determinant of changes in their spreads, after controlling for ratings
eects, ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and certain key interest rates. Another possibility is
that changes in the liquidity of the government bond market drive changes in the spread.
Government bonds carry a signiﬁcant liquidity premium, particularly on-the-run Trea-
suryissues24, afactorthatgivesrisetotheir‘specialness’. However, Collin-Dufresneetal.
(2001) report that aggregate liquidity proxies such as the on-the-run/o-the-run spread
do not explain spread changes. Lacking a measure of liquidity premiums in corporate
bond markets, we examined premiums on government bonds. To arrive at a measure of
24The most recently issued and so most liquid Treasury bond of a particular maturity. Secondary market
‘o-the-run’ Treasury bonds are less liquid.
18liquidity shocks, we projected the on-the-run/o-the-run spread, denoted ONOFF, on six
own lags and six lags of all the explanatory variables used in the VAR. We then ran an
OLS regression of our credit market shocks on the liquidity shocks. The results were as
follows:
ˆ vt =   :0887   :0349 ˆ "ONOFF
t ; R2 = :0
(:925) (:0102) 1984 : 5   2009 : 4
Liquidity shocks have no statistical association with credit shocks. Naturally, this result
does not rule out an independent role for liquidity shocks as a driver of changes in bond
spreads, but it does indicate that the variation in spreads that we identify is not primarily
liquidity-related.
Risk premium shocks: Changes in the non-default component of the spread may be
driven by shocks to risk premiums. Theoretically, even if diversiﬁcation of risk means
that investors’ risk-neutral assessment of default likelihood coincides with the actual
(‘physical’) likelihood we model in the VAR, actual and risk-neutral bond prices need not
coincide as pricing is done under the risk-neutral probability measure25. This means that
changes in risk premiums could be behind non-default moves in spreads. Elton et al.
(2001) ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant portion of time series variation in spreads is due to variations
in the compensation required for bearing systematic risk, by regressing the ‘residual’
spread, after accounting for default, on the Fama-French factors26. Unfortunately, risk
premiums are hard to measure, and no ready empirical proxy exists. One imperfect
possibility is to use the CBOE’s VIX index, a measure of expected 30 day volatility in the
S&P equity index based on index option prices. The VIX can be thought of as primarily
reﬂecting the price of protecting investor portfolios against loss, and as such captures
shifting demand for ‘insurance’ that is likely linked to risk premiums. To construct a risk
premium shock, we projected the logarithm of the VIX index on six own lags and six lags
25See Due and Singleton (2003) for a discussion of this point.
26Thesearereturnsonsmallversuslargestocks, highversuslowbook-to-marketstocks, andexcessreturns
on the market. Elton et al. abstract from liquidity eects.
19of the other variables. We then ran an OLS regression of our credit market shocks on the
risk shocks with the following results:
ˆ vt =   :0999 + 4:29 ˆ "VIX
t R2 = :149
(1:26) (6:27) 1990 : 7   2009 : 4
The strong statistical association between VIX shocks and credit shocks provides support
fortheﬁndinginCampbellandTaksler(2003)thatequityvolatilityhasexplanatorypower
for corporate bond spreads.
3.3 Caveats
An advantage of our VAR-based model of bond spreads is that it does not tie us to
a particular class of parametric term structure model. Further, by allowing for credit
and macro variables to be jointly determined, it explicitly allows for feedback eects
from credit markets to the macroeconomy. However, several potential weaknesses in the
approachshouldbedealtwith. First,theremaybeotherdisruptionstocreditmarketsthat
lead to simultaneous increases in both spreads and default risk, which we cannot easily
separate from other macroeconomic shocks. An example is the ‘credit shock’ modeled
by Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) as an exogenous change in collateral values (formally,
the net worth of the ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints). Of course, our investigation
remains worthwhile, as we cannot know a priori which shock is the most relevant one for
understanding credit market disruptions.
A second consideration is the familiar Peso problem, the possibility that investors
might rationally believe there is a small probability of visiting states where they would
suer large losses, but these states did not occur during the sample period under study.
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001) are able to estimate the Peso eect in U.S. Trea-
sury bonds using multi-country data, but the extension to corporate bonds, although
interesting, is beyond the scope of the present study.
Perhaps more serious is the possibility that, because of segmentation between the
marketsforvariousassetclasses,endogenouschangesinthequantitiesofcorporatebonds
20outstanding are an important driver of spreads27. If ﬁrms issue bonds in anticipation of a
favorableeconomicclimate, thiswilltendtoraisetheirrequiredyieldwithoutnecessarily
raising the likelihood of default, and that would interfere with our inference28. However,
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrms that are relatively ﬁnancially constrained -
such as those who cannot tap the investment grade bond market - are less able to alter
their capital structures in response to favorable macroeconomic conditions in this way.
Another reason for an increased supply of speculative-grade bonds could be increased
downgrades of investment-grade bonds, perhaps as a result of poor economic news. In
this case, although high-yield spreads may increase on the back of increased supply, a
worsening macroeconomic outlook would mean that default risk would also be higher.
A ﬁnal concern is that we require a linear VAR to provide a good enough approxima-
tiontothedatageneratingprocessbothforthemacroeconomicvariables,andimportantly
for bond yields as well. An extension to the linear VAR framework that we do not pursue
here is to allow for conditional mean shifts driven by credit regimes, as in Balke (2000).
He ﬁnds that the propagation of shocks is dependent on prevailing credit conditions,
with substantial ampliﬁcation of shocks in his ‘tight credit’ regime, compared to normal
times. If these eects were important in our sample, we would tend to underestimate the
contractionary eect of credit market shocks in stressed conditions29.
4 Conclusion
Do credit market shocks drive output ﬂuctuations? We investigated this question fo-
cusing on the market for speculative-grade corporate bonds. The view we took was
deliberately narrow, in order to avoid conﬂating credit market shocks with fundamental
27In the case of the paper-bill spread, this possibility has been studied in detail by Friedman and Kuttner
(1998). Note that regulatory changes enacted in the wake of the savings and loan crisis mean that some
investors are unable to hold high yield bonds, and so face a perfectly segmented debt market.
28Althoughinlightofthe‘agingeect’(section2.2),wemightexpectawaveofnewissuestoraiseexpected
default likelihoods.
29Rubio-Ram´ ırez et al. (2005) discuss identiﬁcation of Markov-switching VARs using sign restrictions. We
judged that nonlinearities in higher moments, such as stochastic volatility, were less important for modeling
yield spreads than is the case for yield levels.
21macroeconomic shocks. Our approach made use of a VAR to model the joint behavior of
the macroeconomy and the credit market as in Friedman and Kuttner (1998), Balke (2000)
and Gilchrist et al. (2009). Unlike previous studies, our approach to identiﬁcation was
motivated by explicit economic assumptions. An important component of our strategy
was to account for default risk by modeling historical default rates together with spreads.
This allowed us to purge the eects of expected default from the spread, and in so doing,
isolate the eects of ﬁnancial shocks. As in Uhlig (2005), we left the question of the eects
of credit shocks agnostically open by using sign restrictions on credit spreads and default
rates, while leaving output and other ﬁnancial market prices unrestricted.
Weﬁndthatshockstolendingspreadsinthemarketforlong-termcorporatedebtcause
immediate and prolonged contractions in output. Credit market shocks were found to
have had a negative impact in the 2001 and 2007-9 recessions. However, the average
size of the sector’s contribution to business cycle ﬂuctuations is much more modest than
several recent papers have estimated, contributing around 15% to the variance of output
at the one year horizon. To generate large contributions, a recursive identiﬁcation scheme
which has little theoretical support must be assumed. Nevertheless, our research lends
empirical support to recent theoretical models where ﬁnancial shocks are an independent
source of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
22A Estimation, Inference and Model Selection
This section outlines the speciﬁcation and estimation of our baseline statistical model,
and reviews the sign restriction approach to identiﬁcation. We follow a conventional
estimation strategy, choosing the familiar reduced-form linear VAR(p), written
B(L)yt = ut (3)
whereyt isann-vectorof variablesofinterest, andB(L)is alag polynomial oforderpwith
B0 = In. WetakeaBayesianperspectivetoinference,anddonotincludeanydeterministic
components, such as a constant or trend. We adopt the uninformative priors for (B;)
described by Uhlig (2005, Appendix B). Lag length p was set to 6 months, although the
choice of either 12 months or 3 months was not found to greatly aect the results. The
solution to the VAR is the vector moving average process
yt = C(L)ut (4)
It is usual to transform the reduced form innovations ut to orthogonality to see the
‘distinct patterns of movement’ in the system. A common approach is to assume a
contemporaneously recursive structure by using the lower triangular Choleski factor of




t ] = I (5)
where v
t are the Choleski-orthogonalized residuals. It is straightforward to see that this
factorization of  is not unique. For any nonsingular matrix Q, we can form a new impact
matrix A = A0Q and associated structural shocks vt = Q 1v
t such that the reduced form
covariance structure is preserved. Supposing we choose Q to be an orthogonal matrix,
such that Q 1 = Q0, then we may write
ut = Avt := A0QQ0v
t E[Avtv0
tA0] = AA0 =  (6)
There are many candidate structural VMA representations, each given by an A in
yt = C(L)Avt (7)
23and we select amongst them according to prior sign restrictions placed on the impulse-
response functions. If the matrices Ci in the reduced form moving average representation
are stacked, then the response vectors up to horizon h for a particular model given by










the columns of this matrix. Some blocks will be unrestricted; for example, if a set of sign
restrictions hold only contemporaneously, then only columns of A0Q need be considered.
Similarly, ifthesignoftheresponseofvariableiisfreeundereveryrestrictionvector, then
rows (i;i + n;i + 2n;:::;i + hn) will be unrestricted. The advantage of the sign restrictions
approach is that the tasks of orthogonalizing the VAR residuals and of ensuring that they
obey theoretical priors are separated.
The computational approach is described in Rubio-Ram´ ırez et al. (2005, Algorithm 2):
for each posterior draw of (B;), we draw a Q matrix and check if our sign priors are
satisﬁed for every shock that is to be identiﬁed; if they are not, we draw another Q and so
on until a one is found that does. To obtain Q, we draw an (n  n) Gaussian matrix, and
then compute the orthogonal-triangular or QR decomposition to obtain the orthonormal
matrix Q. Because Q is orthonormal, each column satisﬁes jjqijj = 1 and q0
iqj = 0 for all
i , j. As there exists a Q such that ai = A0qi, this method provides a constructive means
to ﬁnd a set of n impulse vectors A = [a1;:::;an].
Fry and Pagan (2007) have cautioned against certain innovation accounting methods
that fail to preserve the orthogonality between structural shocks. Following their lead,
the ‘median model’ mentioned in the text is found as follows. A single model from
the posterior set is chosen that has an impulse-response function closest to the median
response for each variable and at every horizon. Deﬁne the stacked and standardized
impulse response function for model k by (k) = (vec[R(h)(k)   ¯ R(h)])=std[R(h)]. Then the




where jj:jj2 denotes the usual Euclidean norm, and we set h = 48. The impulse-responses
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NBER Recession High yield default rate High yield bond spread
Note: Spreadisinannualpercentagepoints;defaultrateisthepercentofbondsoutstanding12months
ago that subsequently defaulted, weighted by issuer. The shaded rectangles represent NBER deﬁned
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